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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
by
Walter W. Steele, Ir.*
D URING this annual survey period several enactments of the Texas
Legislature and a few significant decisions by state and federal courts have
resulted in interesting developments in Texas criminal law and procedure.
Although very few of these developments can fairly be characterized as
dramatic, at least the law of crimes and criminal procedure is stabilizing.
With the advent of specialization and refined programs of continuing legal
education, the overall quality of the issues presented on appeal seems to
have increased quite dramatically. Today, many of the arguments presented
to the courts are innovative and apparently well briefed-to the point that
one wonders if the judges, themselves, fully understood the import of what
was before them.
I. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
This year there have been relatively few amendments to the Texas Penal
Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, but several of these statutory
amendments will be discussed in later sections.1
Perhaps the most significant change in the Penal Code is the addition of
section 21.13, which requires an in camera hearing before evidence of a
victim's past sexual conduct may be introduced. Such evidence is to be
admitted only if the court finds "that the evidence is material to a fact at
issue . . . and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value."'2
In another significant enactment the legislature put an end to the confu-
sion surrounding the crime of criminally negligent homicide, a crime which
usually arises out of a vehicular collision. Heretofore, such an event could
be prosecuted under section 19.07 of the Penal Code, or under section 50A
of article 6701d, Texas Civil Statutes." Section 50A of article 6701d has
been repealed and now all forms of criminally negligent homicide are class A
misdemeanors, to be prosecuted under section 19.07 of the Texas Penal
Code. 4
Several significant amendments to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
were adopted this year. Probably the most important of these amendments
* LL.B., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Texas. Professor
of Law and Associate Dean for Clinical Education, Southern Methodist University;
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. See notes 146-49, 175-80, 195-220 infra and accompanying text.
2. Ch. 203, § 21.13, [1975] Tex. Laws 477.
3. See generally Davis v. State, 519 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
4. Note, however, that a homicide committed by accident or mistake by one operat-
ing a vehicle while intoxicated is involuntary manslaughter, not criminally negligent
homicide. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (1974).
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regulates the defenses of incompetency to stand trial and insanity. 5 When-
ever a court appointed expert makes a determination of 'the defendant's
competency to stand trial, the expert's report must be furnished to defense
counsel as well as to the prosecution.6 If a jury finds the defendant
incompetent to stand trial, it must also determine whether there is a
substantial probability that the defendant will attain competence within the
foreseeable future. If it answers this question negatively, no "criminal"
commitment takes place,7 and the defendant must either be committed civilly
under the Texas Mental Health Code or released.
On the other hand, if the jury believes that there is a substantial possibility
that the defendant may regain his competency to stand trial within the
foreseeable future, the defendant is committed to the maximum security unit
at Rusk State Hospital for not longer than twelve months. If he does not
regain his competency within that time, he is recommitted civilly under the
Texas Mental Health Code.
Article 46.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the procedure
for raising the defense of insanity. Article 46.03 has been amended to pro-
vide that the defendant must give ten days written notice of his intention to
raise the insanity defense.8 Note that this provision forces the defendant
to give the state information, but -there is no provision for reciprocal
discovery (e.g., the state has no corresponding duty to reveal the names of
witnesses it will use to refute the insanity defense). Accordingly, this new
amendment to article 46.03 may violate the doctrine of reciprocal discovery
as established by the United States Supreme Court in Wardius v. Oregon.9
If the court appoints an expert to make an examination of the defendant, the
expert's report must be furnished to defense counsel as well as to the prosecu-
tion. 10 If the defendant is found insane at the time of the alleged crime, he
will be committed civilly under the provisions of the Texas Mental Health
Code, but he will be housed in a maximum security unit so long as he is be-
lieved to be "manifestly dangerous." '
Also notable was the amendment of article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to permit the dictation of objections to the court's charge to the
court reporter in the presence and with the consent of the court, provided the
dictation is subsequently transcribed and certified by the court in time to be
included in the transcript on appeal. 12
Article 38.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended to
allow a conviction for a sexual offense on the uncorroborated testimony of
the victim, provided the victim informed someone of the offense within six
months.' s In the same vein, the statute of limitation for rape has been
5. In addition, the legislature made some significant changes in Texas sentencing
laws which are discussed at text accompanying notes 146-49 infra.
6. Ch. 415, § 3(d), [1975] Tex. Laws 1096.
7. Ch. 416, §§ 1-8, [1975] Tex. Laws 1103.
8. Ch. 415, § 2(a)(1), [1975] Tex. Laws 1100.
9. 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973): "We hold that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery
rights are given to criminal defendants. . ....
10. Ch. 415, § 3(c), [1975] Tex. Laws 1101.
11. Id. § 4(b).
12. Ch. 253, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 617-18.
13. Ch. 203, § 6, [1975] Tex. Laws 479.
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extended from one year -to three years. 14
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Developments in the jurisprudence of search and seizure reflected by the
recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinions and United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals opinions are spotty. Warrantless searches of
automobiles and other containers, such as luggage, continue to present the
most interesting cases. In 1974 the United States Supreme Court decided
Cardwell v. Lewis." Cardwell is significant because it continues to expand
the right of police to search an automobile without a warrant. The
defendant in Cardwell, at the request of the police, drove his car to the
police station and parked it in a commercial lot. He was then taken to the
police station and booked, whereupon the lot claim check and the car keys
were taken from him, and the exterior of his car was examined without a
warrant. This conduct by the police was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court because, inter alia, the search of an automobile is not as
intrusive of fourth amendment rights as is a search of the person, and,
therefore, the Court reasoned that the standard for requiring warrants to
search automobiles should not be as strict as the standard for requiring
warrants to search persons or personal places. 1
United States v. Anderson,17 decided by -the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, provides an illuminating contrast to the approach used by the
Supreme Court in Cardwell. Anderson involved a warrantless search of
luggage which the defendants had checked with an airline prior to their
arrest. After the arrest, the police took the claim checks, retrieved the
luggage, and searched it-all without a warrant. The Fifth Circuit held this
search to be invalid on the grounds that luggage deposited with an airline
which may be retrieved by the presentation of a claim check is safe and
secure, and there were no exigent circumstances -to justify proceeding to
search without a warrant. One can readily discern the difference between
the more traditional "exigent circumstances" approach applied by the Fifth
Circuit in Anderson and the new "degree of intrusion" approach used by the
Supreme Court in Cardwell.
In those cases where the police do obtain a warrant before searching, an
entirely different set of issues arises. These issues arise because the criminal
justice system absurdly requires that a police officer draft one of the most
sophisticated of all legal documents-a statement of probable cause in an
affidavit for a search warrant. Federal procedure attempts to alleviate this
problem by allowing a magistrate to examine the officer under oath on the
record, and to supplement the content of the affidavit with his statements.' 8
14. Id. § 5, at 478.
15. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
16. Id. at 591. For a similar argument in connection with the law of arrest see
Steele, A Proposal To Legitimate Arrest For Investigation, 27 Sw. L.J. 415 (1973).
17. 500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974). See Wood v. State, 515 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974), for an interesting example of the Texas approach to the warrantless
search of automobiles.
18. FED, R. CluM. P. 41(c) provides in part: "Before ruling on a request for a war-
1976]
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An interesting problem was presented in United States v. Acosta19 where the
magistrate supplemented -the affidavit with information within his own
personal knowledge. Unfortunately, however, the magistrate did not dictate
into the record the fact that he was relying on his own personal knowledge of
the facts, so the affidavit, which was inadequate on its face without the
inclusion of the facts known to the magistrate, was held to be inadequate in
law.
Pecina v. State20 is a recent Texas case raising issues about the construc-
tion of search warrant instruments. In Pecina a warrant was obtained to
search the defendant's home and automobile. Consistent with the standard
Texas practice, the search warrant also contained an arrest warrant. 21 The
defendant was arrested before the search of the house and car which
revealed nothing. At book-in a search of the defendant revealed forty-five
packets of heroin. At his trial for the possession of heroin defendant argued
that the arrest warrant could not become operative unless contraband was
discovered during the execution of the search warrant. The court of
criminal appeals dismissed this argument out of hand, stating: "The com-
mand -to arrest . . . is separate and distinct from the command to seize the
contraband. It is contained in separate paragraphs of the warrant and
includes no limiting phraseology. It is clearly an unconditional com-
mand."'22 The lawyers in Pecina also challenged the validity of the warrant
on the grounds that the executing officers had made an erroneous return-
they reported that no arrest was made when, in fact, they had arrested and
booked the defendant. The court of criminal appeals held that an erroneous
return does not vitiate an otherwise valid warrant.
Sometimes third parties are involved in the search and seizure process. A
common example is where officer A gives officer B sufficient information to
amount to probable cause to search without telling officer B the source of the
information. Bazan v. State23 was such a case, and the court of criminal
appeals held the fruits of officer B's search inadmissible unless officer A
either testified about the source of his information, or there was other proof
that officer A's source of information was reliable. Another situation in
which third persons may be involved in the search and seizure process ex-
ists when third persons make the searches. Of course, the restrictions of
the fourth amendment apply only to government agents, not to private
citizens. 24  In United States v. Mekjian 2 5 a private citizen supplied the
Government with incriminating information about her employer which she
had obtained from her employer's private records. During the period in
rant the federal magistrate or state judge may require the affiant to appear personally
and may examine under oath the affiant and any witness he may produce, providing
that such proceeding shall be taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment
and made part of the affidavit."
19. 501 F.2d 1330 (SthCir. 1974).
20. 516 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
21. TEx. CODE CrM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.03 (Supp. 1975-76).
22. 516 S.W.2d at 403.
23. 522 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
24. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921).
25. 505 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1975).
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which the employee was supplying information, she was in communication
with government agents, but they gave her no instructions or advice concern-
ing her breach of the privacy of her employer's records. The Fifth Circuit
indicated that such a situation necessarily involves a factual determination
of the extent of government involvement in the invasion of the defendant em-
ployer's fourth amendment rights. Although the court refused to overturn the
district court's determination that there was no government involvement, the
court stated that "where federal officials actively participate in a search
being conducted by private parties or else stand by watching with approval
as the search continues, federal authorities are clearly implicated in the
search and it must comport with fourth amendment requirements."2 6  Mek-
jian places a heavy burden on the Government whenever it attempts to
disassociate itself from the illegitimate acts of cooperating private individuals,
and bears careful reading by lawyers with clients who have been the victims
of private informants.
III. INDICTMENTS
Only a few of the recently decided cases involving indictments have been
notable. The most significant federal case in this area is United States v.
Briggs,27 where the court discusses the phenomenon of unindicted co-
conspirators, a situation which arises almost exclusively in the federal courts.
In Briggs the Government obtained a conspiracy indictment against seven
named defendants and three other named but unindicted persons. Those
named but unindicted challenged the authority of the grand jury to place
their names in an indictment without actually charging them with a crime.
Pointing out that the issue has not been decided by appellate courts, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the three petitioners and ordered
their names expunged from the indictment. In a well-considered opinion,
the court indicated how naming a person as a perpetrator in an indictment
without actually charging him amounted to accusing that person of a crime
without giving him a forum in which to vindicate himself. Such an act is the
antipode of the role which the grand jury is supposed to play, i.e., to shield
people from the abuse of power by the prosecution.
Texas' forward-looking waiver of indictment procedure 28 received an
innovative challenge in Chapple v. State.29 After agreeing to waive indict-
ment and proceed by information, Chapple challenged his conviction be-
cause the information was not based on a sworn complaint, as required by
article 21.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.30  With two judges
26. Id. at 1327.
27. 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.41 (Supp. 1975-76) provides: "A person
represented by legal counsel may in open court or by written instrument voluntarily
waive the right to be accused by indictment of any offense other than a capital felony.
On waiver as provided in this article, the accused shall be charged by information."
29. 521 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
30. TEx. CODE IM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.22 (1966) provides:
No information shall be presented until affidavit has been made by some
credible person charging the defendant with an offense. The affidavit
shall be filed with the information. It may be sworn to before the dis-
19761
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dissenting, and one judge concurring, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that a complaint is required only in misdemeanors. Therefore, when a
defendant waives a felony indictment and agrees to proceed on an informa-
tion, no complaint is required. In another case dealing with the sworn
complaint described in article 21.22 the court held that no inquiry into the
nature and extent of the knowledge of the person who signs a complaint will
be permitted if the complaint is adequate on its face. 3 1 That holding is
altogether consistent with earlier holdings by the court -to the effect that an
affidavit for a search warrant, if adequate on its face, cannot be challenged
on grounds that the affiant had inadequate knowledge a
2
Obviously, the new Penal Code has generated new forms of indictments,
some of which are now being tested in the courts. Gonzalez v. State
3 3
reflects an example of these cases. Gonzalez changes the long-standing rule
that an indictment for burglary with intent to commit theft must allege all of
the constituent elements of the theft. In Gonzalez the court reasoned that
since the various forms of theft have been consolidated in the new Penal
Code, there is no reason to continue to require the allegation of all
constituent elements of theft in a burglary indictment.
3 4
Seemingly, a different approach was taken in Jurek v. State,3 5 the first
case to discuss indictments under Texas' new capital murder statute.3 6 Each
count of this indictment alleged not only a voluntary homicide, but also
alleged all of the constituent circumstances necessary to bring the killing
under the capital murder statute: namely, that the defendant "voluntarily
• . . killed [the victim] by choking . . .and was then and there in the
course of committing and attempting to commit kidnapping and forcible rape
upon the said [victim]." '37  According to the court, the allegation of the
constituent elements of capital murder is essential to a valid indictment, and
the indictment is not duplicitous because the constituent circumstances of
capital murder are alleged along with the homicide. Similar reasoning was
used in Woerner v. State38 where the adequacy of an indictment under the
Texas Controlled Substances Act was before -the court. Under the Con-
trolled Substances Act both the jurisdiction of the court and the punishment
range are keyed to the amount of marijuana possessed, e.g., more than four
ounces is a felony of the third degree.3 9 Woerner challenged his indictment
because it merely alleged he possessed "more than four ounces," and did not
allege how much he possessed in excess of four ounces. The court of
trict or county attorney who, for that purpose, shall have power to admin-
ister the oath, or it may be made before any officer authorized by law to
administer oaths.
31. Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
32. E.g., Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
33. 517 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
34. See also Earl v. State, 514 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), holding that
all of the constituent elements of theft need not be alleged in an indictment for robbery.
35. 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
36. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (1974).
37. 522 S.W.2d at 940-41. Article 19.03(a)(2) makes it capital murder to inten.
tionally commit murder in the course of kidnapping or aggravated rape.
38. 523 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
39. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.05 (Supp. 1975-76).
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criminal appeals upheld the indictment as sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court and to establish the penalty range, which is tantamount to
advising the defendant adequately of the crime with which he is charged. On
the other hand, in Medrano v. State,40 the court overturned a conviction
under the Controlled Substances Act even though the error in the indictment
was raised for the first time on appeal. Medrano's indictment wholly failed
to allege any particular amount of marijuana and, therefore, was fatally
defective.
Indictments for rape under the new Penal Code were discussed in Coby v.
State.41  Section 21.09(a) of the Penal Code defines rape as sexual
intercourse with a female under seventeen years; however, section 21.09(b)
provides a defense if the female is fourteen years or older and is pro-
miscuous. Under these sections, if an indictment for rape alleges no
more than intercourse with a female under seventeen years, does it ade-
quately advise the defendant of the charges, or must the indictment go
further and allege the exact age of the victim? Coby answers the second
question negatively, reasoning that the state is not required in its indictments
to negative defenses, such as the one provided by section 21.09(b). 42
IV. EXTRADITION
The fact that extradition proceedings have taken on new importance is
exemplified by the en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Prince v. Alabama.43 Prince complained of the nine-year delay between his
indictment and trial on Alabama criminal charges. Alabama's excuse for
the delay was that Prince had been incarcerated at length in California. Ala-
bama attempted to establish "good faith" by showing that they wrote to the
California authorities about Prince's availability on thirteen different occa-
sions. Furthermore, Alabama contended that it would have been futile to
attempt to extradite Prince from the custody of the California prison
authorities. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Alabama
position. In a strongly worded opinion the court pointed out that a state
must take "affirmative action" to secure the return of an indicted defendant
for trial, and that "affirmative action" means an attempt at extradition, even
though the demanding state speculates that -the attempt at extradition will be
rebuffed. 44
The recent landmark Texas decision of Ex parte Rosenthal4r has simpli-
fied the process of extradition in Texas to the point that one wonders what
useful function a lawyer for the defendant can serve at extradition proceed-
ings. Expressly overruling Ex parte Ivey,46 the court of criminal appeals
held in Rosenthal that a demand for extradition accompanied by an
information supported with a sworn complaint is sufficient, even though
40. 524 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
41. 518 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
42. See generally TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03 (1974).
43. 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 705.
45. 515 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974).
46. 419 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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there is no showing that the laws of the demanding state permit prosecution
for a felony upon complaint and information. Furthermore, Rosenthal holds
that the adequacy or sufficiency of the charging papers from the demanding
state is not material to the extradition hearing: "The sufficiency of the
indictment, information or affidavit as a criminal pleading is not at issue in
the asylum state."'47  Given the holding in Rosenthal, it appears that the
only remaining issue which a defense counsel could raise at the extradition
hearing would be that the subject of the proceeding was not the man wanted
by the extraditing state. But in Ex parte Viduari4s the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals severely limited even that tactic. In the face of Viduari's
protestations that he was not the wanted man, the court approved his
extradition to Missouri because the state introduced an affidavit from a
Missouri detective stating that he had examined the photograph of Viduari
forwarded by the Texas prosecutor, and that Viduari was, indeed, the man
wanted in Missouri. Obviously, defense counsel is relatively powerless when
faced with an ex parte affidavit of an out-of-state witness which is based
upon a photograph that defense counsel had no part in taking or sending.
V. MULTIPLE PROSECUTION
Conceptually, multiple prosecution is a difficult area of the law, largely
because the legal issues encompassed are multiple. For example: When
does jeopardy attach? When does one trial bar another? When can a
sentence be increased? Not only is the law of multiple prosecution concep-
tually difficult, it is also a rapidly developing area of criminal jurisprudence.
At the bottom line is the question of when jeopardy attaches. In Serfass v.
United States49 the United States Supreme Court declared: "In the case of a
jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled." 50 Contrary to the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Serfass is the Texas position that
jeopardy does not attach in a jury case until after the jury is impaneled and
the defendant has entered his plea before that jury.51
A determination that jeopardy has attached "begins, rather than ends, the
inquiry as to whether the 'Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial."'52 Next
comes the problem of whether jeopardy actually does shield a defendant
from further litigation. There are, in fact, many instances when jeopardy
attaches (e.g., defendant has entered his plea before an impaneled jury) and
the defendant may, nevertheless, be subjected to more than one possibility of
conviction. For example, in United States v. Wilson53 the trial judge
dismissed the indictment after the defendant had been found guilty. The
Government appealed the dismissal, but the defendant contended that the
Government's appeal subjected him to double jeopardy. Although jeopardy
47. 515 S.W.2d at 119.
48. 525 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
49. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
50. Id. at 388.
51. Lockridge v. State, 522 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
52. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973).
53. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
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had certainly attached in this case, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Government's appeal of the dismissal of the indictment did not
violate the concept of double jeopardy, because the defendant would not be
tried again even if the Government's appeal were sustained. Since the
defendant had been tried and convicted before the indictment was dismissed,
sustaining the Government's appeal would merely reinstate the conviction; it
would not subject the defendant to a second trial. 54 Wilson's doctrine is
clarified in United States v. Jenkins, 5 another recent Supreme Court
opinion. In Jenkins the trial judge dismissed the indictment at the conclu-
sion of a bench trial, but it was not entirely clear if the judge based his
dismissal on a point of law or on inadequate evidence of guilt. In contrast
to Wilson, the Supreme Court denied the Government's appeal in Jenkins
because sustaining that appeal would force a second hearing in the trial court
to resolve the factual issues which were not clearly resolved by the trial
judge. Holding a second hearing in the trial court would, indeed, violate the
defendant's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy.
In addition to a right not to be subjected to two trials, the right to have the
trial completed once it has begun is also a part of the doctrine of multiple
prosecution. For example, if a trial judge declares a mistrial after a
defendant has entered his plea, jeopardy has clearly attached. But the
question remains as to whether the attaching jeopardy will shield the
defendant from a second trial? United States v. Alford,5" decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contains an excellent
discussion of that problem. According to the court:
When the judge declares a mistrial on his own or the prosecutor's mo-
tion, a retrial is allowed only if there exists a manifest necessity for the
declaration of a mistrial where 'the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated.' . . . In determining whether there is a manifest
necessity for the declaration of a mistrial, the courts are to weigh the
'defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tri-
bunal' against the 'public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just
judgments.' 57
A mistrial was granted in Alford after it was discovered that the United
States Attorney had mailed the wrong indictment to the defendant's attorney.
"Manifest necessity" won out over the "defendant's valued right to have his
trial completed," and the Fifth Circuit held that granting the mistrial did not
preclude the Government from re-trying the defendant.
Should the defendant be denied his jeopardy protection when a mistrial
results from a prosecutor's blunder, or worse yet, prosecutorial overreaching?
Unfortunately, reasonable minds may differ over whether or not a blunder
by the prosecutor or the judge is sufficiently serious to merit shielding the
54. "[Tlhe prohibition against multiple trials [is] the controlling constitutional
principle." Id. at 346. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 532 (1975), quoting Price
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause ...is written in
terms of potential of risk of trial and conviction, not punishment.").
55. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
56. 516 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975).
57. Id. at 944-45.
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defendant from a re-trial. We have already seen in Alford that mailing the
wrong indictment is not so serious a blunder as to bar the Government from
re-trying a defendant after a mistrial. In United States v. Dinitz,58 however,
the court decided that a defendant could not be re-tried because the mistrial
was the result of the trial judge's summarily discharging a defendant's trial
attorney and ordering the attorney removed from the courtroom. Apparent-
ly, the answer to the question of when a defendant can 'be re-tried after a
trial lies in a case-by-case examination -in which courts attempt to balance
society's desire to penalize prosecutorial manipulation or judicial misconduct
against the ends of public justice which would be served by re-trying a
defendant. 59
Suppose the defendant deliberately waits until jeopardy attaches before
making the court aware of some defect warranting a mistrial. In a way, this
problem is the flip side of the one presented above, i.e., if a defendant
should not be prejudiced by prosecutorial overreaching, should the prosecu-
tion be prejudiced by defense overreaching? For example, should a defend-
ant who knows that the charging paper is defective, but who waits until
jeopardy attaches before calling the defect to the court's attention, be
protected by jeopardy, thus preventing him from being re-tried on a correct-
ed indictment? That question was answered recently 'by the Fifth Circuit
court in United States v. Kehoe6° as follows: "We believe that a defendant
who for reasons of trial tactics delays until mid-trial a challenge to the
indictment that could have been made before the trial-and before jeopardy
has attached-is not entitled to claim the protection of the double jeopardy
clause when his objections to the indictment are sustained." '61 United States
v. Kehoe is a well-reasoned opinion, although it may seem a bit shocking at
first. One mollifying fact that should not be overlooked is that a charging
paper with substantive defects never puts a defendant in jeopardy in the first
place, so a mistrial in such an instance could never affect the state's right to
re-try the defendant.6 2
Collateral estoppel is the last multiple prosecution issue to be discussed.
Collateral estoppel means that a fact once determined in a trial cannot be
relitigated in another trial. For example, in Johnson v. Estelle 8 the
defendant was found not guilty of burglary with intent to commit rape. In a
second trial defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape.
Both charges arose out of the same episode. The defendant's contention,
with which the Fifth Circuit court agreed, was that his acquittal on -the
burglary charge meant that the jury in the first trial had a doubt as to his
identity or as to his intention to commit rape; and consequently, those issues
58. 492 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), af 'd, 504 F.2d 854 (1974) (en banc), cert. granted, 420
U.S. 1003 (1975) (No. 74-928).
59. See generally Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
60. 516 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 86. Query: What would be the result if the record showed that the de.
fendant discovered the defect for the first time during the trial?
62. See generally Steele, The Doctrine of Multiple Prosecution in Texas, 22 Sw. L.J.
567, 574-75 (1968).
63. 506 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1024 (1975).
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could not be re-litigated in another trial wherein the charge was assault with
intent to rape.
Despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Johnson v. Estelle, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has been less sympathetic to claims of collateral estoppel.
In Warren v. State64 the Texas court denied a claim of collateral estoppel
arising out of a conviction for receiving stolen property which occurred after
an acquittal of burglary arising from the same episode.
In Jones v. State 5 the court pointed up the distinction between collateral
estoppel and the doctrine of prior conviction. Jones had been convicted of
rape, and in a second trial was convicted of a burglary that arose from the
same episode. As the court correctly concluded, collateral estoppel is
applicable only where there is a prior acquittal. Where there is a prior
conviction, the only limitation on a second trial is the doctrine of carving,
which was not applicable in Jones.6
Jones was decided under the old Penal Code, but it suggests an interesting
problem under the new Penal Code. As mentioned above, Jones was
convicted of burglary with intent to commit rape after 'being convicted of
rape (same episode). According to section 30.02 of the new Penal Code,
part of the definition of burglary in the first degree is injury to an occupant
of the building. Therefore, it seems likely under the new Code that the
doctrine of carving will protect a defendant who is convicted of rape (i.e.,
injury) and then tried and convicted again of burglary in the first degree
(i.e., the same injury).
VI. CONFESSIONS
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has long required that after arrest
a person must be taken before a magistrate for arraignment, warning, and
bail setting.67 During this period, however, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, and consequently the police, have uniformly and pervasively
ignored those provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly,
people in Texas can be arrested, jailed, and interrogated-all without seeing
or taking to anyone other than the arresting officers. If the arresting
officers give Miranda warnings, and the person "intelligently" waives his
fifth amendment rights, the Texas courts refuse to exclude his confession-
despite the fact that the confession may have been obtained as a result of the
illegal arrest. 68 Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that failure to follow the Code of Criminal Procedure
in such an instance does not constitute error of constitutional dimension.
Whitaker v. Estelle 9 is typical of this approach:
It does appear that Whitaker was not taken promptly before a magis-
trate following his warrantless arrest as required by Texas law. Ver-
64. 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
65. 514 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
66. See generally Steele, supra note 62, at 572-74.
67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.06, 15.17 (Supp. 1975-76).
68. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 504 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 829 (1974).
69. 509 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
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non's Ann. C.C.P., art. 14.06 (Supp. 1974). However, it is well settled
that such a defect rises to the level of constitutional error only when
it can be shown that the accused's defense has been prejudiced in some
manner. Here, the only intimation of prejudice is that Whitaker's con-
fession was in fact obtained during the period of his detention. How-
ever, Whitaker does not make, nor would the record support, any claim
of a causal connection between the two. The record shows that Whit-
aker was arrested at approximately 11:00 p.m. on December 10, and
made his confession at 10:40 the following morning; moreover, the rec-
ord further reflects that Whitaker was fully warned of his constitutional
rights prior to making the statement.70
According to Whitaker, and many other state and federal cases like it, all the
police need to do is to arrest, jail, and interrogate their suspect, making sure
that the Miranda warnings are given and that overt efforts at intimidation
are avoided, and the suspect's confession will be admissible.
Perhaps the most complimentary remark one can make about such a
judicial attitude toward the pervasive phenomenon of illegal arrest-detention-
interrogation is that it is naive. Defense counsel, prosecutors, police, and
others who live and move in the real world know that a suspect who has
received the Miranda litany before he confesses never will be able to
convince a court that there is any prejudicial connection between his illegal
arrest and ultimate conviction, because the courts choose to ignore the
obvious-that the prejudice they are looking for is present in the form of the
confession itself; a confession that never would have been given had it not
been for a custodial interrogation imposed upon a person who has been
illegally deprived of his liberty.71
There may be a light at the end of the tunnel, although it does not
emanate from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals or from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; instead, it comes -from the
Supreme Court of the United States in the form of two recent cases. First,
in Gerstein v. Pugh the Supreme Court held that a person arrested without a
warrant, and detained, must be given a probable cause hearing before a
magistrate "promptly after arrest."'72  Gerstein is based on the fourth
amendment; therefore, we may conclude that the take-before-the-magistrate
provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 73 do, indeed, have
70. Id. at 196-97.
71. E.g., Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
72. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
73. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.06 (Supp. 1975-76) provides:
In each case enumerated in this Code, the person making the arrest shall
take the person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary delay be-
fore the magistrate who may have ordered the arrest or before some mag-
istrate of the county where the arrest was made without an order. The
magistrate shall immediately perform the duties described in Article 15.17
of this Code.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Supp. 1975-76) provides in part:
The magistrate shall inform in clear language the person arrested of the
accusation against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his right to
retain counsel, of his right to remain silent, of his right to have an attor-
ney present during any interview with peace officers or attorneys repre-
senting the state, of his right to terminate the interview at any time, of his
right to request the appointment of counsel if he is indigent and cannot
afford counsel, and of his right to have an examining trial. He shall also
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constitutional dimensions, despite holdings to the contrary by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and the Fifth Circuit.
Brown v. Illinois74 is the second recent Supreme Court case that bears on
this problem. Brown raised the issue of whether or not giving the Miranda
litany, per se, breaks the causal connection between an illegal arrest and a
confession. While admitting that a person being held illegally may decide to
confess as an act of free will, the Supreme Court went further and pointed
out:
If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint
of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful
the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule
would be substantially diluted. . . . Arrests made without warrant or
without probable cause, for questioning or 'investigation,' would be en-
couraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom hopefully
could be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving
Miranda warnings. 7 ,
Taken together, Gerstein and Brown mean that if a Texas citizen is
arrested by police without a warrant and not taken before a magistrate, a
confession by that citizen will not be admissible merely because the Miranda
warnings were given. But Gerstein and Brown have an even greater
significance; they mean that the Supreme Court is aware of and opposed to
the reprehensible police tactic of making an illegal arrest to gain the
opportunity to secure a confession, which in turn is used to bootstrap a
conviction. 6 Indeed, such a sequence of events took place in Brown, and
the court expressly declared that "the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct" 77 is a relevant factor in judging the admissibility of the
confession. Moffett v. Wainwright,78 a recent case, contains a useful list of
factors to be considered when determining the connection between an illegal
arrest and a subsequent confession. The court considered the following as
the most significant:
[W]hether substantial intervening occurrences take place between the
time of the illegal arrest and the statements which are sought to be ad-
inform the person arrested that he is not required to make a statement and
that any statement made by him may be used against him. The magis-
trate shall allow the person arrested reasonable time and opportunity to
consult counsel and shall admit the person arrested to bail if allowed by
law.
Note that neither of these articles specifically requires the magistrate to determine that
there is probable cause to hold the suspect, although such a determination is clearly
called for by the Gerstein opinion.
74. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
75. Id. at 602.
76. The conduct of the arresting officers in Brown which may be considered typical
was described by the Supreme Court in the following manner:
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The im-
propriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually
conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged in
their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for investigation' or
'questioning.' . . . The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evi-
dence in the hope that something might turn up.
Id. at 605.
77. Id. at 604.
78. 512 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1975).
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mitted, as for example the opportunity to consult with an attorney, or
to terminate interrogation, and secondly, the extent to which the arrest
was a gross violation of legal processes as opposed to a failure to com-
ply with technical requirements. 79
Regardless of whether the initial arrest was legal, waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege is obviously the essential question. Whether a waiver
is present when the person interrogated is represented by counsel, the police
know it, and, nevertheless, proceed to interrogate him outside the presence of
his counsel, reflects a difficult problem. Two recent Texas cases deal with
this question. In Harris v. State80 the court placed a heavy burden on the
prosecution to establish waiver of the fifth amendment privilege where a
suspect has expressed a desire for an attorney or has actually talked to an
attorney prior to confessing. The court also stated that the boilerplate
waiver language on confession forms was only a factor to be considered,
certainly not the controlling factor. In Self v. State8' the court unequivocally
held that a suspect under interrogation can waive his right to the presence
of counsel, even though that counsel has already been appointed and the
police know who he is. However, the court in the Self case implies that if
counsel instructs the police not to interrogate his client, such instructions
might be enforced by the court.
What happens if instead of waiving his fifth amendment privilege, a
suspect remains silent? In United States v. Hales2 the suspect remained
silent during his pretrial interrogation but took the stand at trial and testified
about an alibi. On cross-examination the prosecutor attempted to impeach
the suspect by establishing that he did not mention his alibi while being
interrogated. The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's
questions were improper, because no inference of guilt can be drawn from a
suspect's choice to take advantage of his fifth amendment privilege when it is
explained to him in .the Miranda warnings.
Confusion is still present in Texas over whether a principal's confession is
admissible at the trial of his accomplice. At one time there was a well-
settled Texas rule that such confessions were admissible, but that rule was
thrown into doubt in 1968 when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided Schepps v. State.83 Ex parte Smith8 4 is the most recent case on the
subject, 'but it does not entirely settle the matter. Smith was on trial as an
accomplice and the confession of his principal was admitted over Smith's
objection that the confession was hearsay and its admission constituted a
violation of Smith's right to confrontation and cross-examination. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Smith, but seemed to leave the door
open for the admission of a principal's confession provided all references to
79. Id. at 503, citing Phelper v. Decker, 401 F.2d 232, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1968).
80. 516 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
81. 513 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
82. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
83. 432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). For a discussion of the Schepps case
see Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 229(1970).
84. 513 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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the accomplice are deleted from it. By deleting all references to the
accomplice, the prosecutor could still use the principal's confession at the
trial of the accomplice to establish the guilt of the principal. Prior to the
enactment of ,the new Penal Code guilt of the principal had to be established
at the trial of an accomplice.8 5 With the advent of section 7.03 of the new
Penal Code, it may no longer be necessary to establish the guilt of a
principal at the trial of an accomplice s.8  Therefore, the matter is now more
confused than ever, and may not be resolved until section 7.03 of the Penal
Code is interpreted by the court.
VII. VOIR DIRE
Jury voir dire is a focal point for the tension between a judge's desire to
keep his docket moving and a lawyer's desire to try his case in a slow and
careful fashion. By its nature, voir dire is a deliberate and ponderous
undertaking, and consequently judges have developed tactics for hurrying
lawyers through it. One such tactic is simply to place a time limit on a
lawyer's voir dire. In Barrett v. State87 the judge limited a defense attorney
to thirty minutes voir dire in an aggravated assault case. This tactic was
upheld, but the record reflected that many of the questions the defense
lawyer wished to propound were not germane.88
One of the most common tactics of judges is to ask many of the voir dire
questions themselves. Judges feel that their method of propounding voir
dire questions is more efficient and businesslike than those of the lawyer.
Thus, in Smith v. State,s9 a murder case, the court qualified the veniremen
on the full range of punishment and refused to permit the defense attorney to
ask questions about that aspect of the case. Again, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld the judge's actions because any further questions
by the attorney along those lines would have been repetitious.90
Another popular tactic for limiting a lawyer's voir dire is to deny him the
right to ask certain questions. This tactic reduces the amount of time the
lawyer spends talking to the panel and also may 'be used to protect the panel
from embarrassing questions. After all, a jury panel seated in an elected
judge's courtroom commands respect. For example, in Burkett v. State,91 a
85. Tucker v. State, 461 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919
(1971).
86. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.03 (1974) provides in part:
In a prosecution in which the actor's criminal responsibility is based on
the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of commis-
sion of the offense and that he was a party to its commission, and it is no
defense:
(2)' that the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally respon-
sible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has
been convicted of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from
prosecution.
87. 516 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
88. "This Court does not condone the arbitrary limitations of voir dire. However,
under the circumstances presented here, we are unable to conclude the trial court abused
his discretion in limiting the voir dire." Id. at 182.
89. 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
90. Id. at 827.
91. 516 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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peddling obscenity case, the trial judge refused to permit the defense
attorney to ask each venireman this question: "Do you believe that it is
morally wrong for an adult person to have magazines or books in their
homes that show pictures depicting sexual intercourse and acts of oral
sodomy?" 92  The court of criminal appeals explained in Burkett that the
question of whether a verdict will be reversed because the trial judge refused
to allow particular voir dire questions depends upon the reason the question
is being asked. If the question is asked in order to exercise a peremptory
challenge, the test is not the same as the one applied if the question is asked
with a view toward exercising a challenge for cause. When a question is
asked in order to exercise peremptory challenges, and its asking is denied,
intelligent use of peremptory challenges is lost, so harm is automatically
shown. 93 Therefore, on appeal an attorney need only show that he sought
to ask a relevant question for peremptory challenge purposes, and the judge
refused to allow that question. 94 However, the lawyer in Burkett failed to
make that showing because he failed to bring forward the entire jury voir
dire into the appellate record, so the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
unable to determine if the question refused was merely repetitious of other
questions asked during the voir dire. Therefore, lawyers who are refused
permission to ask questions designed to lead to peremptory challenges would
be well advised to take an exception, then drop the matter entirely, i.e., they
should not seek to rephrase the question. Then, if the record of the entire
voir dire is brought forward on appeal, reversal would appear to be a
relative certainty. On the other hand, if the question sought and refused is
one leading to a challenge for cause the procedure is different. In such an
instance no reversible error is shown unless the defendant exhausts all
peremptory challenges and one or more objectionable jurors sit on the case.
Perhaps Alexander v. State95 is the epitome of the "hurry-along-counsel"
approach to voir dire so common in many courtrooms. After the jury list
had been prepared, and as the panel was being seated in the courtroom,
Alexander filed a pro se motion to shake under article 35.11 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. 6 One can imagine the consternation of the
trial judge: the clerk had laboriously prepared the jury list; the bailiff was in
the process of seating the jurors; and now the defendant files a pro se motion
92. Id. at 148.
93. [T]he decision as to the propriety of any question is left to the discretion
of the trial court and the only review will be for abuse of that discretion.
... The discretion is abused when a proper question about a proper
area of inquiry is prohibited.
Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
94. See generally Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
95. 523 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
96. The trial judge, upon the demand of the defendant or his attorney, or of
the State's counsel, shall cause the names of all the members of the gen-
eral panel drawn or assigned as jurors in such case to be placed in a re-
ceptacle and well-shaken, and the clerk shall draw therefrom the names
of a sufficient number of jurors from which a jury may be selected to try
such case, and such names shall be written, in the order drawn, on the jury
list from which the jury is to be selected to try such case, and write the
names as drawn upon two slips of paper and deliver one slip to the State's
counsel and the other to the defendant or his attorney.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (1965).
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to shake. If the motion is granted, the names will have to be shaken; a new
list prepared; and the jurors may have to be removed from their seats and
reseated. As might be expected, the judge denied the motion, but he was
overruled by the court of criminal appeals because article 35.11 provides an
absolute right to have the names shaken at any time prior to the actual voir
dire examination. Thus, the trial judge's effort to save time resulted in a
reversal of the defendant's conviction. Defense counsel might note Alexan-
der's teaching that a motion to shake can be filed after the jury list is
prepared, thus affording defense counsel the additional option of taking the
panel in its original order instead of automatically asking to shake in all
cases.
VIII. WITNESSES
During the period covered by this Survey an unusual number of cases
have appeared dealing with the mechanism by which witnesses testify at
trial. Several of those cases suggest useful trial strategies, while others
point out common pitfalls which ought to be avoided.
Many cases discuss the problems which arise when a defendant appears
for trial in jail clothing, but Thompson v. State9 7 is unusually instructive in
this regard because it deals with the problem from the standpoint of any
witness who appears in jail clothing. Thompson repeats the general rule that
the discretion of the trial judge determines whether or not a defendant or a
witness should be allowed to appear in jail clothing and/or in shackles. 98
But, according to Thompson, if a judge decides that an appearance in jail
clothing and/or shackles is justified, his reasons must be clearly reflected in
the record, "not in general terms but with particularity." 99 Furthermore,
the judge must instruct the jury not to consider the clothing or the shackles in
determining guilt.
One of the most common episodes involving witnesses arises when one
side impeaches a witness by proving that the witness has previously been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Until the
recent decision of Poore v. State'0 0 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
had never addressed the question of what happens if a witness denies the
finality of the conviction introduced to impeach him. Reasoning that a mere
denial of the finality of the conviction was not sufficiently reliable, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that documentary evidence is required to
deny the finality of the conviction introduced for impeachment purposes. 10 '
Frequently, a defendant will offer character witnesses who testify that the
defendant's reputation for truth and for being a law-abiding citizen is good.
97. 514 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
98. "The test on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in requiring
the witnesses to appear in jail uniforms and in handcuffs." Id. at 278.
99. Id.
100. 524 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
101. "When the impeaching party has established the fact of conviction, either by
the witness' own admission or by tendering the judgment and sentence to the court, the
burden should then shift to the party offering the witness to introduce competent, docu-




Such testimony is offered to convince the jury that the defendant did not
commit the offense because he is generally of good character. United States
v. Leigh,102 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, holds that a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that
evidence of good character, along with other evidence, may create a
reasonable doubt about guilt. Instructing the jury to consider evidence of
good character as an indication of innocence is not a common practice
among Texas courts. Perhaps more lawyers should request such instruc-
tions, using the model provided in Leigh.
Attempts to bolster one's own witnesses are common in all jurisdictions.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently adopted a very liberal
attitude toward bolstering in the case of Elam v. State.'08 In Elam, before
eliciting any substantive testimony of a police witness, the prosecutor was
allowed first to ask: where the witness was born; where he was raised; if he
had completed high school; whether he had served in the armed forces;
where he had served; the day be was employed by a police agency, and the
length of his police service; what his first duties were; the nature and length of
training he had undergone; whether he had training in addition to his regular
training; and the cities and counties to which he had been assigned. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals approved this practice on the grounds that
it places the witness "in context" for the jury and it "enables both the
defendant and the jury to assess the weight to be given to a witness'
testimony and to evaluate his credibility."'10 4 In fact the usefulness of such
information in aiding the defendant or jury in evaluating a witness' testimony
seems tenuous indeed. On the other hand, in certain cases in some Texas
cities one can imagine the prejudicial effect (to the prosecution or to the
defendant) of testimony about where a witness was "raised." Furthermore,
in light of the homily that "sauce for the goose is sauce for -the gander," it is
interesting to speculate whether or not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
would approve a defense lawyer's cross-examination of a police witness
about the matters listed in Elam in a case where the prosecution did not raise
those matters on direct. Would the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals hold
that the cross-examination was relevant because it helped to place the
witness "in context" (e.g., the state's witness was raised in New York City;
was 4F; was new to the job; and had just moved to town from Las Vegas,
Nevada)?
While bolstering one's own witness is commonplace, impeaching one's own
witness is generally forbidden, except where the offering attorney can
establish surprise. Brown v. State'0 5 presents an up-to-date primer on the
law and procedure for establishing surprise as a prerequisite to impeaching
one's own witness. First, the record must reflect that the witness' testimony
was injurious to the case of the party who presented that witness. Second,
that party must demonstrate, outside the presence of the jury, that he was,
102. 513 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975).
103. 518 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
104. Id. at 369.
105. 523 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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indeed, surprised by the witness' testimony. This second element can be
established by cross-examining the witness, outside the jury's presence, about
prior inconsistent statements. Another approach is for the lawyer or investi-
gator who interviewed the witness to take -the stand and reveal earlier
contrary statements of the witness. Only when both elements of this test
have been satisfied is the court permitted to find surprise and, thereby, to
allow the attorney to impeach his own witness in the presence of the jury.
In Texas, the "Gaskin Rule" is another useful technique for impeaching a
witness. 10 6 Although article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
makes written statements of witnesses in the possession of the state exempt
from pre-trial discovery, the "Gaskin Rule" forces the state to produce such
statements for inspection and use for cross-examination after the witness has
testified in court. Repeatedly, the court of criminal appeals has ruled that
the "Gaskin Rule" applies to all witnesses who testify for the state.10 7 But
what about witnesses who testify for the defense--does the state have a right
to be given copies of written statements made by defense witnesses in the
files of defense counsel? In United States v. Nobles'"8 that very issue was
before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court held that the
prosecution did, indeed, have a right to see written statements made by
defense witnesses after they testify in court. 109  Because Nobles was
prosecuted in a federal court, it is not clear whether the Nobles decision is
based on the United States Constitution or on the Court's inherent power to
supervise proceedings in lower federal courts. Nevertheless, the Court did
go to great lengths to discuss the fifth amendment privilege as well as the
work product rule that arises out of the sixth amendment, and to hold that
neither prevented the Court's holding that a trial judge has discretion to
compel production of a witness' statement in the files of defense counsel after
that witness has testified. Undoubtedly, it will surprise some defense
counsel to learn that the growth in discovery practice in criminal cases may
become a two-way street.
Another way in which witness statements can be discovered by the
defendant is through a "Brady Motion,"" l0 requesting the state to produce
all exculpatory evidence in its files. Although there is no longer any doubt
that a defendant may obtain discovery through the use of a "Brady Motion,"
there is still some question as to the point in a trial at which 'the state must
produce any exculpatory material in its possession. In Payne v. State"' the
defense contended -that it was entitled to receive the exculpatory material
prior to trial. Admitting that several federal jurisdictions do favor the pre-
trial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals adopted the following position:
106. Gaskin v. State, 353 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
107. E.g., Hoffman v. State, 514 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
108. 422U.S. 225 (1975).
109. Of course, the Nobles ruling would not apply to written statements in defense
counsel's file made by the defendant, himself, because such statements are clearly pro-
tected by the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 234.
110. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
111. 516 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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Despite the announced policy in these federal jurisdictions, the legisla-
tive policy of Texas is to the contrary. Art. 39.14, V.A.C.C.P., spe-
cifically excepts written statements of witnesses from pre-trial discovery.
We do not feel compelled to expand upon the rule followed in this state
since the procedure of disclosing such evidence at trial affords the appel-
lant an opportunity to request a postponement or continuance which
adequately satisfies due process requirements .... 112
Special problems are created both for the state and defense whenever the
entrapment defense is raised. In United States v. Gomez-Rojas"1 3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that if a defendant presents
a prima facie case of entrapment, the Government must call its entrapping
agent as a witness if he is available. If the agent elects to invoke the fifth
amendment, the trial court must determine whether the fifth amendment claim
is well-grounded; and if the court so finds, it then must consider whether the
defendant should be allowed to place -the agent on the stand and force him
to plead the fifth amendment in the presence of the jury.
If a defendant presents evidence of entrapment, the state is permitted to
introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character and reputation. In
United States v. Fink"14 the court allowed the prosecution to introduce
evidence of the defendant's bad reputation, but refused to allow the defend-
ant to cross-examine the reputation witness concerning specific events or
facts which led the witness to form his opinion, because: "character reputa-
tion is established not by what one knows to be fact concerning another, but
by what one has heard in the community about the person in question." 115
Consequently, the defendant was unable to impeach the character witness
who had testified that talking to confidential informants and examining files
in a sheriff's office led him to his conclusion, that the defendant had a
reputation in his community as a drug smuggler.
As reflected in Fink, prosecutors often present police officers to testify
about a defendant's bad character, and these officers frequently base their
testimony on information which they have received from reading police files
and rap sheets while initially investigating the case. In Mitchell v. State 16
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established the following rules to
govern the admissibility of such testimony: First, the court indicated that
reputation testimony cannot be based solely on what the witness has heard
about the current offense.' 17 The court next noted that a witness who
testifies that the defendant's reputation is good need not have discussed the
defendant's reputation with anyone in the community. 1 8 Finally, the court
stated that a witness who testifies that a defendant's reputation is bad can
base that opinion in part on what he learned from police files, but he must
also have discussed the defendant's reputation with someone, because bad
112. Id. at 677.
113. 507 F.2d 1213 (SthCir. 1975).
114. 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974).
115. Id. at 5, citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948).
116. 524 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
117. Id. at 512.
118. Id. at 513.
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reputation is based on what the witness has heard, not what he knows.11 9
In reality, there may be little difference between a witness who bases his
testimony solely on what he .has read, and a witness who bases testimony on
what he has read bolstered by what he has discussed. In fact, in both
instances, the witness' opinion may arise solely from the investigation of 'the
case and from access to police records, rather than from access to community
opinion. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario:
Detective (talking to himself out loud): "My goodness, this defendant has a
rap sheet as long as your arm!" [At this point the detective is not qualified
to testify about the defendant's bad character.]
Detective (talking to the sergeant): "Sergeant, I have just read this defend-
ant's rap sheet, and I think he is a bad actor."
Sergeant (responding): "Yes sir, he is a bad actor all right." [At this point,
the detective is qualified to testify about the defendant's bad character.]
One of the most difficult problems in the law governing witnesses was
presented in De Luna v. United States,1 20 decided in 1962. In De Luna
two co-defendants were denied severance; and at trial, one of the defendants
took the stand and the other did not. During jury summation counsel for the
testifying co-defendant made an adverse comment about the other co-
defendant's failure to testify, thus bringing about a reversal of the non-
testifying defendant's conviction. In the recent case of United States v.
Hodges121 defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to extend the De Luna
doctrine. In Hodges several co-defendants were tried together and some
testified at trial and some did not. During jury summation counsel for one
of the testifying defendants commented favorably about his client's willing-
ness to testify. On appeal a defendant who did not testify contended that
his fifth amendment privilege had been impinged, citing De Luna. The
United States Court of Appeals ,for the Fifth Circuit distinguished the two
cases with this comment: "A mere favorable comment upon the fact that one
of several co-defendants testified does not involve the same potential for
prejudice as an adverse comment by counsel upon the failure to testify of the
other co-defendant."' 12
A different problem related to the De Luna doctrine was presented in
United States v. Spinella. 2 3 In Spinella co-defendants were denied sever-
ance, tried, and convicted. Spinella, one of the defendants, moved 'for a
new trial and attached the affidavit of Buchanan, another co-defendant.
Buchanan's affidavit related -that he would testify so as to exonerate Spinella
if a new trial were granted. The trial court granted the motion and a new
trial was held, but Spinella never called Buchanan to testify, whereupon the
trial court vacated its order of granting a new trial and attempted to reinstate
the original conviction against Spinella. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court had no power to revive
119. Id.
120. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
121. 502 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. Id. at 587.
123. 506 F.2d426 (SthCir. 1975).
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Spinella's original conviction, which became a nullity when the new trial was
granted. Furthermore, since there was no manifest necessity to abort the
second trial, jeopardy had attached to Spinella, and he could not be tried
again. In effect, Spinella stood acquitted-a free man. Cases like Hodges
and Spinella raise grave doubts about the frequent practice in federal courts
of conducting joint trials for co-defendants. The difficulties presented by
joint trials may very well outweigh any advantages or economies gained by
avoiding the time and expense of trying each defendant separately.
White v. State124 is one of the most interesting Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals opinions ever written on the subject of witnesses. Prior to trial
White filed a motion for a continuance, alleging -that a witness who was
present at the scene of the alleged crime was unavailable because the police
had instructed that witness to leave town. The state did not deny that the
witness (who was a police informant) was present at the scene of the alleged
crime, nor did the state deny the fact that the police had encouraged the
witness to leave town (allegedly for his own safety). Reasoning that this
action by the state was tantamount to suppressing material evidence, the
court initially reversed and remanded the conviction, stating, inter alia:
Just as the State's interest in confidentiality of an informer must yield
in a proper case, despite its interest in encouraging and protecting him,
so too must the informer be made available in a proper case. Other
means are available for the protection of a material witness than sending
him out of town and rendering him totally unavailable to either party. 125
On rehearing the court concluded -that the conviction should stand because
the defendant had not fully developed the record as to whether the witness
actually was beyond the reach of a subpoena. Despite the fact that -the
result in White ultimately turned on the technical state of the record, the
court's first opinion should be carefully studied whenever a case presents
facts involving an informer who was present at the scene of the alleged
crime. Undoubtedly, White will precipitate more litigation in the future
because of the well-known propensity of police to secrete informers after a
case is made.
IX. HOMICIDE
Surprisingly, perhaps, very few significant cases dealing with homicide
were decided during the period covered by this Survey. In a related area,
the court of criminal appeals upheld the definition of "bodily injury" in the
new Penal Code'1 2 against an attack that it was vague and uncertain.' 27
Three other cases were decided which make the previously obscure distinc-
tion between non-criminal accidental homicide and criminal negligent homi-
cide more apparent.
124. 517 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
125. Id. at 548.
126. "Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical con-
dition." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a) (7) (1974).
127. Ramirez v. State, 518 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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In Esparza v. State12s the defendant held his crying child by the legs and
swung him about the room, hoping to make the child dizzy so that he would
go to sleep. The defendant stated that he, himself, became dizzy and
staggered; whereupon the child's head struck some furniture, resulting in a
fatal injury. Defendant testified that he did not intend to injure the child
and the court gave a charge on accidental homicide, but refused to charge on
negligent homicide. The court of criminal appeals reversed on the grounds
that the court should have charged on both accidental and negligent homi-
cide. First, the court declared that the distinction between accidental
homicide and negligent homicide is that accidental homicide arises from an
act unintentionally done, while negligent homicide arises from an act inten-
tionally done, although there is no intent to kill. ,Esparza testified about
intentionally swinging the child and unintentionally becoming dizzy and
staggering. Therefore, he effectively raised both accidental homicide and
negligent homicide and was entitled to have the jury instructed on both.129
In Stiles v. State"10 the defendant was charged with and convicted of
murder. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on negligent homicide,
although it did give an instruction on accidental homicide. Stiles picked his
child up to eye level and dropped him on the bed, whereupon the child
bounced off the bed, sustaining fatal injuries. Stiles testified' that he had no
intent to harm the child and that his actions were only intended to make the
child stop crying. Reversing the conviction, the court of criminal appeals
held that Stiles was entitled to a jury instruction on negligent homicide be-
cause his conduct was intentional. Furthermore, the court of criminal appeals
stated: "When charges on both negligent homicide and accidental homicide
are requested and there is doubt in the mind of the court as to which should
be submitted the proper course is to submit both issues.' 13 '
The final case in the trio is McKenzie v. State.'32 McKenzie, who was
charged with and convicted of murder, testified that his child was killed
while he and the child were executing an acrobatic maneuver wherein
McKenzie would "flip" the child. The trial court gave a jury instruction on
accidental homicide, but refused McKenzie's request for an instruction on
negligent homicide. Again, the case was reversed and again the court of
criminal appeals stated that whenever the evidence shows an intentional act
(in this case, the fact that McKenzie intentionally "flipped" the child) a
charge on negligent homicide must be given.
128. 520 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
129. If the facts raise the issue of negligent homicide, then a charge on that
subject, if properly requested, must be given. If the accused requests
charges on both accident and negligent homicide, and there is any doubt
in the court's mind as to which issue should be submitted, the accused
should be given the benefit of that doubt with charges on both being sub-
mitted. . . . While ordinarily a clear defense of accident will not raise
the issue of negligent homicide, this will not invariably be the case.
When the issue is raised, as it was here, the accused is entitled to benefit
from a charge on the subject.
Id. at 893.
130. 520 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
131. Id.at899.




Sentencing, as a legal process, is attracting more and more attention in the
courts. As the sentencing process has come under increased judicial scruti-
ny, once routine procedures are being questioned and abandoned. Conse-
quently, there appears to be some confusion between new legal sentencing
procedures 'and old illegal ones.
Resentencing, that is, the imposition of a harsher second sentence, is a
constant matter of controversy. In Ward v. United States133 a trial judge
agreed orally to reduce the defendant's sentence, but after the defendant was
incarcerated the judge received new sentencing information and changed his
mind. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the judge to his original agree-
ment, pointing out that there is a kind of jeopardy which attaches to a sen-
tence after a defendant is incarcerated, and under this principle a judge can-
not impose a harsher sentence after incarceration. Although the judge's
pronouncement of sentence was oral in this case, nevertheless, it became final
once the defendant was incarcerated.
Appeals from the imposition of sentences occur frequently when a second,
harsher sentence is imposed after a defendant has prosecuted an appeal
resulting in a reversal of his first conviction. In Ex parte Bowman134 the
defendant's first conviction and seventeen-year sentence was reversed. On
retrial the defendant was reconvicted and the judge imposed a twenty-five-
year sentence. Increasing the sentence was justified by the judge on the
grounds that additional information about the severity of the crime had been
adduced at the second trial. On appeal the imposition of the second
sentence was reversed, because new information cannot be used .to justify a
harsher sentence unless the new information concerns conduct that occurred
after the original conviction. 135 A different result was reached in Llerena v.
United States"' 6 where a second, harsher sentence was imposed because the
first sentence did not conform to the penalty provisions of the applicable
statute, i.e., the first sentence was illegal. In that instance the court has "the
duty to correct the sentence so as to comply with the statute even though
service of the sentence first imposed has begun, and though the corrected
sentence is required -to be more onerous."' "37
Routinely, a defendant's past criminal record is considered in setting his
sentence.'13  Frequently, however, questions about the validity of the past
criminal record are raised. Thomas v. Savage 1 9 is a case that may answer
some of the questions involving the introduction of prior convictions at a
sentencing hearing. Thomas appealed his ninety-nine-year sentence for
robbery on the grounds that of the five prior convictions introduced at his
sentencing hearing, one conviction was obtained at a time when Thomas was
133. 508 F.2d 664 (5thCir. 1975).
134. 523 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
135. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
136. 508 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975).
137. Id. at 81.
138. See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Supp. 1975-76).
139. 513 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1975).
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indigent and without counsel. Convinced that the one prior conviction out
of five prior convictions had no effect upon the sentence imposed for the rob-
bery, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the error to be harmless. A
similar result was reached in Barnes v. Estelle,140 where eight prior convic-
tions were introduced at sentencing, two of which resulted from proceedings
in which the defendant was not represented by counsel. The sentencing
judge in Barnes advised the appellate court that he would have imposed the
same sentence without the two convictions in question and, consequently, the
error of using the convictions was held to be harmless.
Defense attorneys can only speculate over the amount of influence a
prosecutor has on the sentences imposed by a judge. Certainly, there is
reason to assume that some prosecutors discuss potential sentences with the
judge privately and even provide the judge with information outside the
record. 141 In United States v. Huff142 the defendant discovered a private
memorandum from the prosecutor to the sentencing judge which contained
numerous statements of "facts" dehors the record (e.g., Huff ",hung out with
well-known pushers"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit remanded the case for resentencing, stating, inter alia: "The memo-
randum went beyond the record, and more importantly, the manner of its
submission deprived the defendant of his fundamental due process right to
hear and rebut all that the prosecution has to say against him bearing on the
judgment of sentence.' 143 Note that this ruling seems to be of constitutional
dimension. If so, attorneys for defendants in state courts might be well-
advised to be more alert for ex parte, sub rosa communications between the
prosecutor and the judge, because such communications may provide
grounds for appeal to federal court. A somewhat different problem was
presented in United States v. Rogers.'44  There the sentencing judge
imposed a harsh sentence based, in part, on reports from the prosecutor that
the convicted defendant was refusing to name other participants in the crime.
Contrary to some other federal circuits, the Fifth Circuit held that a
defendant has a fifth amendment right not to discuss his crime, and a harsh
sentence may not be imposed to induce a defendant to waive that right.
More litigation 'has occurred over guilty pleas in the past year than over
any other aspect of sentencing. The standard for mental competency to
enter a guilty plea has never been precisely determined, and in Malinauskas
v. United States'45 the defendant contended that the standard for mental
competency to enter a guilty plea should be higher than the competency
standard for being tried. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that the standard for judging competency at the time of trial and at
the time of entering a guilty plea are the same.
In a series of cases the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made substantial
changes in the law relating to the entry of guilty pleas. Subsequently, the
140. 518 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1975).
141. Ex parte Reynolds, 462 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
142. 512 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1975).
143. Id. at 71.
144. 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974).
145. 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974).
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legislature amended article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which requires the judge to make the defendant aware of the consequences
of his plea, to bring it more in line with the recent pronouncements of the
court of criminal appeals. Guster v. State146 is the most significant of the
above-mentioned cases. In Guster the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
overruled a number of prior cases and held that "where there is no showing
that a defendant was prejudiced or injured by the failure of the trial court to
fully comply with article 26.13, supra, and where no objection is made to
such failure at the time the plea is accepted or by motion for new trial, that
failure to fully comply will not constitute reversible error on appeal.' '1 4
7
As mentioned above, article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been amended to reflect the holding in Guster. Article 26.13 now provides,
inter alia, that "[iln admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial
compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively
shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was
misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.' 48  Perhaps Walker
v. State149 provides some insight as to how the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals will interpret the phrase "substantial compliance" contained in the
amended statute. Walker entered a guilty plea and the judge gave him
absolutely no admonishment about the punishment range. In the eyes of the
court of criminal appeals this failure amounted to a total disregard of article
26.13, and therefore, the conviction was reversed. Perhaps the most that
can be said at this point is that admonishments will not be as significant a
part of guilty plea procedure as they have been in the past.
Admonishments are-not the only trouble spot in the guilty plea process.
Even more problems are raised by the proposition that the plea must be
voluntary. Defendants routinely testify that they are pleading guilty volun-
tarily, when in fact, they are pleading guilty because various promises have
been made to them. What happens if these promises are not -fulfilled?
Should the defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea on the grounds that it
was not voluntarily made? 150 In Walters v. Harris'5 1 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals characterized the problem in the following manner:
"Examination of the defendant alone will not always bring out into the open
a promise that has induced his guilty plea. It is well-known that a
defendant will sometimes deny the existence of a bargain that has in fact
occurred, out of fear that a truthful response would jeopardize the bar-
gain.' 52 Unlike the sympathetic attitude expressed by the Fourth Circuit
in Walters, the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
146. 522 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
147. ld. at 495.
148. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(c) (Supp. 1975-76). See generally
Cogan, Entry of the Plea of Guilty in Texas: Requirements and Post-Conviction Re-
view, 29 Sw. L.J. 714 (1975).
149. 524 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
150. In Bouchillon v. Estelle, 507 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1975), the court pointed out
that Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), does not require that a defendant
be allowed to withdraw his plea.
151. 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972).
152. Id. at 993. See also Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975).
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have adopted a different approach. In United States v. Barrett15 3 the Fifth
Circuit refused to hear a defendant's contention that he was lying when he
stated that he was not coerced, and that his plea was knowing and voluntary.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit held that if a plea 'appears from the record to be
voluntary, a defendant will not later be allowed to contend that he was
lying.15 4 A similar position was taken by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals recently in Williams v. State,'55 wherein the court held that the written
waiver form executed by the defendant at the time of his plea could .be relied
upon to prove that the plea was freely and voluntarily made. In -the
language of the court of criminal appeals:
The Supreme Court's requirement for determination of voluntariness
is the consideration of the entire record. The review of the voluntari-
ness of the guilty plea should not be based solely on questions and an-
swers in the statement of facts, but on the record as a whole.
When a defendant pleads guilty he surrenders many valuable rights.
We have held, however, that he must affirmatively waive trial by jury,
or the judge must empanel a jury. For that waiver we accept a written
statement signed by the defendant. Why then can't we accept a written
statement from the defendant saying that he was uninfluenced by fear,
persuasion or delusive hope of pardon as evidence that it plainly ap-
peared to the trial judge that the appellant was uninfluenced by such
factors? 156
Of course there are better ways to insure the voluntariness of a guilty plea
than relying upon court records which contain pro forma waivers as in the
Williams case. For example, in Galvan v. State' 57 the trial judge explained
to the defendant in detail that he was not bound by the attorney's recom-
mendation of punishment, and that although he was aware that the defend-
ant had applied for probation, he was not obligated to grant probation. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals characterized this as "highly desirable
practice" and rejected the defendant's contention that it was incumbent on
the court to go further to determine the voluntariness of the plea. Consistent
with that holding, the recent amendment of article 26.13 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure requires judges to admonish a defendant entering a
plea of "the fact that any recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to
punishment is not binding on the court."'
' 58
Seemingly, the Fifth Circuit has devised an even better solution to the
problem. That court now requires that whenever a defendant enters a plea
of guilty in a federal district court he must be placed under oath and
admonished that plea agreements are permissible and that the defendant and
all lawyers have a duty to disclose the existence of any such agreements. 15 9
153. 514 F.2d 1241 (5thCir. 1975).
154. Id. at 1243; accord, Johnson v. Massey, 516 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1975); cf.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
155. 522 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
156. Id. at 485-86.
157. 525 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
158. TEx. CODE CraM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a) (2) (Supp. 1975-76).




One frequently asserted ground for requesting post-conviction relief is that
the grand jury which indicted the defendant was improperly formed. To
some extent, that tactic was foreclosed in 1973 by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Tollett v. Henderson,160 where the Court held that a
guilty plea cuts off the defendant's right to complain subsequently about
jurisdictional defects such as an indictment returned by an improperly
formed grand jury. 'However, in Tollett the Court expressly -reserved the
question of "whether the fact that the grand jury was improperly formed
might be raised as a basis for obtaining a federal writ of habeas corpus after
a plea of not guilty and trial by jury." 161 'Recently, two different panels of
the 'United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the
question reserved in Tollett, only to reach differing conclusions. In Eggles-
ton v. Estelle'62 the court remanded to the district court to determine
whether under Texas law the defendant had waived his right to challenge the
grand jury by not seeking to do so in advance of trial as required by article
19.27 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In Dumont v. Estelle16 s
the court was not so circumspect, holding that under Texas law the right to
challenge a grand jury is, indeed, lost if the challenge is not made prior to
trial. However, the Dumont opinion also examines the question of whether
waiver under Texas law constitutes a bar to relief by federal habeas corpus.
According to the court, relief by federal habeas corpus is available even if
the point is waived under Texas law, but only if the defendant can show
meritorious "cause" by showing actual prejudice. No actual prejudice was
shown in Dumont and the writ was, therefore, dismissed for failure to comply
with the Texas law.
-Ineffective assistance of counsel is another frequently asserted ground for
seeking post-conviction relief in federal court. Where the allegedly ineffec-
tive counsel was privately retained there has been considerable conflict
among the appellate decisions. One line of decisions reasoned that no state
action was involved if privately retained counsel was ineffective, hence there
was no denial of due process.'1 4  Contrary cases held that the standard of
effectiveness was the same for both privately retained and court appointed
counsel. 165 A recent en banc decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Fitzgerald v. Estelle,16 6 attempts to settle the controversy. Ac-
cording to the majority opinion in Fitzgerald the test for competency of
counsel is:
[W]henever the actions of retained counsel operate to deprive the trial
of fundamental fairness then the Fourteenth Amendment due process
160. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
161. Id. at 260 n.1. It seems curious that the Court would reserve this question in
light of its holding in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), to the effect that
a defendant in a federal court must conform with the rules and raise the issue of an
improperly formed grand jury prior to trial, and that failure to do so waives the issue.
162. 513 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1975).
163. 513 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
164. E.g., Howard v. Beto, 375 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1967).
165. E.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966).
166. 505 F.2d 1334 (Sth Cir. 1974).
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[has] been violated notwithstanding any kind of specific involvement
by a particular state official. If a retained counsel's actions do not sap
the proceedings' fundamental fairness, but are challenged as less than
reasonably effective in violation of the Sixth Amendment, state involve-
ment through actual or constructive awareness of the error by the judge,
prosecutor, or other responsible official who could have corrected it,
must be shown. 167
Just how a judge or prosecutor is supposed to "correct" the situation when a
defendant's retained counsel is incompetent was not clarified by the court. If
a judge declares a mistrial on these grounds, the doctrine of jeopardy may
prevent another trial. Furthermore, any interference by the judge or the
prosecutor in the attorney-client relationship could later be construed as an
interference with the sixth amendment itself.
A provocative issue was raised by the Director of Corrections for Florida
who, in In re Wainwright'68 complained of a United States Magistrate who
released a Florida prisoner on bond while that prisoner's habeas corpus
petition worked its way through the federal courts. The Fifth Circuit court
confirmed the proposition that a federal district court (and consequently the
federal magistrate) has the inherent power to release a state prisoner on
bond pending hearing on habeas corpus. Although this decision is undoubt-
edly a correct one, this power of federal judges to free state prisoners on
bond previously has been largely hidden or ignored. One may only
speculate whether this will remain the case once the Wainwright decision
becomes common knowledge among jail-house lawyers.
XII. PROBATION AND REVOCATION
Statutory amendments and recent court opinions relating to probation are
making the law in this area absurdly arcane. For example, the well
established rule in Texas had been that when a jury assessed a fine and a
prison term in a felony and then recommended probation, both the fine and
the prison term were automatically suspended, and the court could not
require that the fine be paid as a condition of the probation. 169 Now
section 3a of article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure has been
amended to provide, inter alia, that "When the jury recommends probation, it
may also assess a fine applicable to the offense for which the defendant was
convicted."' 70 Thus, although the language is not as explicit as it could be,
the legislature appears to have given the jury the power in a felony case to
suspend both fine and punishment, or to impose a fine and suspend only
punishment. However, for some inexplicable reason the legislature did not
make corresponding amendments in article 42.13 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure which covers misdemeanor probation. Therefore,
Faugh v. State,171 holding that a defendant on probation cannot be ordered
167. Id. at 1338.
168. 518 F.2d 173 (5thCir. 1975).
169. E.g., Shappley v. State, 520 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
170. Ch. 110, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 264.
171. 481 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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to pay part of his fine as a condition of probation, stands as the law in
misdemeanor cases. This inexplicable difference between probation in
felony cases and probation in misdemeanor cases is carried a step further by
the addition of section 6b to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. 172 New section 6b gives a court in a felony case the power to
probate a sentence, but as a condition of that probation the court may
require the defendant to "submit to a period of detention in a penal
institution or to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed 30 days or 1/3
of the sentence whichever is lesser.' 173 Once again, however, the result is
different for misdemeanors. In the recent case of Lee v. State174 it was held
that a trial court is without authority to probate a portion of the jail sentence
and order confinement as to the remainder following a misdemeanor convic-
tion.
Another legislative change that adds to the confusion in this area is the
addition of section 3d to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.75 Curiously, new section 3d is limited to pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere before the court in a felony case. In such an event the court
may "defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt,
and place the defendant on probation on reasonable terms as the court may
prescribe . . . . 176 If the defendant violates a reasonable term of his
probation the court may, for the first time, enter an adjudication of guilt for
the original offense, whereupon "all proceedings, including assessment of
punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation and defend-
ant's appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been de-
ferred."'T"
This statute raises a number of questions. For example, does limiting the
favorable provisions of this statute to pleas of guilty before the court violate
the doctrine of United States v. Jackson, 78 wherein the United States
Supreme Court struck down a statute permitting imposition of the death
penalty only if recommended by a jury, because such a scheme discouraged
the defendant's exercise of his right to seek a jury trial? Also, if a defendant
accepts the benefits of this statute and then violates a condition of his
probation, may he then ask for a jury to assess his punishment? May he
seek probation from the jury under article 42.12, section 3a?
Another amendment to the statutes allows a defendant who is in jail on a
probation violation charge to petition the court and to receive a hearing
within twenty days.' 79 If alleged probation violators learn of this new right
to a "speedy trial" they will be able to protect themselves to some extent
from the abuse of being jailed and held for unreasonable periods of time
while awaiting a hearing on the revocation of their probation. However, we
172. Ch. 341, § 4, [1975] Tex. Laws 909-10.
173. Id.
174. 516 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
175. Ch. 231, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 572-73.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
179. Ch. 467, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws 1243-44, amending TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12, § 8(a) (1966).
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must assume that, on the whole, incarcerated persons will remain ignorant of
their rights, and since this new statute requires a motion from the defendant
before the twenty days begins to run, little real change can be expected.
One statutory amendment does have a beneficial effect on misdemeanor
probation. It allows a court to grant probation in a misdemeanor case re-
gardless of the fact that the defendant has been on probation within the last
five years, provided the prior probation was not for a "like offense."180
Unfortunately, the new cases in the area of probation are comparable in
degree of complexity to the legislation discussed above. For example, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit apparently have differing viewpoints concerning the quan-
tum of proof necessary to revoke probation. In United States v. Franci-
schine'8 1 the Fifth Circuit declared: "All that is required is that the evidence
and facts be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the
probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of proba-
tion.' 1 82 On the other hand, in Scamardo v. State' 88 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, after admitting that "[tihis court has not delineated de-
finitively the quantum of evidence necessary to support an order of revocation
of probation,"' 8 4 chose to hold that "an order revoking probation must be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence; in other words, that greater
weight of the creditable evidence which would create a reasonable belief that
the defendant has violated a condition of his probation."' 85
Differences between the federal approach and the Texas approach also
extend to the question of whether or not the validity of the underlying
conviction can be raised at a hearing to revoke probation. In United States
v. Francischines6 the defendant contended that the validity of the underly-
ing conviction is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time in any
proceeding, including a hearing to revoke probation. But the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the validity of a conviction should play no part in determining
whether an alleged probation violation should result in the revocation of a
probated prison term, until that conviction is judicially nullified.'8 7 The
court reasoned that "the sentencing court and those charged with the control
and custody of a convicted prisoner should remain free to supervise the
terms of the sentence without being baggaged with concern as to the validity
of the conviction.'
' 1 88
On the other hand, in Standley v. State'89 the Texas court reaffirmed its
prior position that a conviction which is fundamentally defective can, indeed,
be challenged for the first time at the probation revocation proceeding.
180. Ch. 341, § 5, [1975] Tex. Laws 910, amending TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.
art. 42.13, § 3 (1966).
181. 512 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1975).
182. Id. at 829.
183. 517 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
184. Id. at 297.
185. Id. at 298.
186. 512 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1975).
187. Id. at 828.
188. Id. at 829.
189. 517 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). See also Thomas v. State, 525 S.W.2d
172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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Perhaps the Texas viewpoint is more sensible, since reviewing the validity of
the underlying conviction along with the alleged violation of probation
maximizes judicial resources by consolidating the two cases.
In Wright v. State'90 the majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
apparently held that a violation of probation may be established merely by
introducing documentary evidence of a conviction for another offense during
the probationary period, without the necessity of going forward to prove that
the person convicted and the probationer are one and the same. However,
there is a strong dissent in Wright by Judge Onion, joined by Judge Roberts,
and Wright may be in for further clarification as similar cases are appealed.
Another issue of some interest was raised in Cotton v. State,191 where the
court held that probation can be revoked upon proof of the commission of
another offense, even though prosecution for that offense is barred by limita-
tions. Although there is no necessity for a conviction of the subsequent of-
fense prior to revoking probation,'19 2 the holding in Cotton seems unreason-
able if statutes of limitations are designed in part to protect courts from stale,
and thus unreliable, proof. In effect, the court is saying that probation can
be revoked on the basis of proof too stale to obtain a conviction in the first
instance.
Two other cases are worthy of mention. In Franklin v. State'98 the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant whose conviction in case
one is on appeal is eligible for probation in case two; but a defendant whose
probation revocation is on appeal is not eligible for probation in another
case. In Dorsche v. State'94 the court of criminal appeals in a footnote
indicated that imposition of a curfew would be a reasonable condition of
probation in some cases.
XIII. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
Probably the most significant recent developments in the law of juvenile
delinquency are the amendments to the Texas Juvenile Code passed by the
Sixty-Fourth Legislature.' 95 Of these, the most dramatic is the amendment
of title III, section 51.09, which deals with the waiver of rights by juveniles.
The new amendment to section 51.09 deals with the waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination (i.e., confessions given by a
juvenile as a result of custodial interrogation). Apparently, the legislature
intended to make it legally possible for a child-without the benefit of
counsel-to waive his fifth amendment privileges provided: first, that
certain warnings detailed in the amendment are given to the child by a
magistrate; second, that the confession is in writing;' 96 and third, that the
190. 523 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
191. 523 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
192. E.g., Farmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972).
193. 523 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
194. 514 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
195. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.01-56.02 (1974).
196. Paragraph (b)(2) was added to section 51.09 in an apparent attempt to allow
oral confessions in juvenile court if the confession leads to evidence, in a fashion similar
to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 1(e) (Supp. 1975-76). Read literally,
paragraph (b)(2) of section 51.09 would allow such an oral confession even though it
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confession is signed outside the presence of any law enforcement officer and
in the presence of a magistrate, who must certify that the child made an
intelligent waiver.
Although the legislative intent of this amendment is obvious, the language
of the amendment leads to the conclusion that it may be an unconstitutional
violation of the principles espoused in Miranda v. Arizona.197  Read
together, paragraphs (b)(1)(A), (B), and (C) of the amendment may not have
the effect of fully and adequately advising a child of his right to have an
attorney appointed if he cannot afford one. 198 Advice about the right to a
court-appointed attorney has been held by both Texas and federal courts
to be an absolute prerequisite to the validity of a confession.' 99 Accordingly,
even if the procedure set forth in the amendment to section 51.09 is meticu-
lously followed, there will remain serious questions about the admissibility of
the confession.
Whenever a confession by the juvenile is offered, trial courts would be
well advised to follow the procedure outlined in Sims v. Georgia,200 and enter
a specific finding of voluntariness into the record. Apparently, the issue of
voluntariness will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 201  One can
speculate that the presence or absence of parents at the time the confession
is given will be very significant, if not crucial. 202 Lawyers representing a
child should pay close attention to the legality of the arrest leading to the
confession, since an illegal arrest may taint a confession, even if proper
Miranda warnings are given.208  In particular, lawyers representing children
should be familiar with sections 52.01 and 52.02 of the Juvenile Code which
establish rigorous guidelines for the arrest of children and their disposition
after arrest. It should be noted at this point, that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has made it clear that the admissibility of a juvenile's confession will
be tested by the special standards of the Juvenile Code, even though the
juvenile has been certified and is on trial as an adult. 20 4
was not preceded by Miranda warnings. Obviously, however, any confession (written
or oral) taken during custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings.
See generally Steele, Developments in the Law of Interrogations and Confessions, 1
NAT'L J. CiuM. DEFENSE 111 (1975).
197. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
198. (A) he may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that
any statement he makes may be used in evidence against him;
(B) he has the right to have an attorney present to advise him either prior
to any questioning or during the questioning;
(C) if he is unable to employ an attorney, he has the right to have an at-
torney to counsel with him prior to or during any interviews with peace
officers or attorneys representing the state;
Ch. 693, § 9, [1975] Tex. Laws 2154.
199. United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Burns v. State, 486
S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
200. 385 U.S. 538 (1967); accord Husk v. State, 305 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
201. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), is a bench mark for standards of voluntari-
ness relating to a juvenile's confession.
202. See Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974), holding that con-
fession by a juvenile must be considered under the prevailing test of totality of the cir-
cumstances, with the absence of a parent or guardian as only one factor to be taken
into consideration.
203. See notes 67-86 supra and accompanying text.
204. Lovell v. State, 525 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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The Sixty-Fourth Legislature made numerous other amendments to title III
of the Family Code, but only those most significant to practicing lawyers will
be noted here. The definition of "delinquent conduct" in section 51.03(a)
and the definition of "conduct indicating a need for supervision" in section
51.03(b) have both been broadened. "Delinquent conduct" now includes
violation of a "reasonable and lawful order of a juvenile court entered under
section 54.04 or 54.05 of this code" (probation order) .205 "Conduct indicat-
ing a need for supervision" now includes violating the penal laws prohibiting
driving while under the influence of intoxicating substances. 20 6  In effect,
these definitional changes, plus the repeal of section 54.04(g),20 7 make it
possible to commit a child to the Texas Youth Council for violating a proba-
tion order that arose from an earlier finding of conduct in need of supervi-
sion (e.g., runaway). However, the legislature also provided by amendment
that a child committed to the Texas Youth Council because he violated a
probation order that arose from an earlier finding of conduct in need of
supervision cannot be institutionalized with "true" delinquents. 208
The amendments reestablish the power of the juvenile courts to suspend an
order committing a child to the Texas Youth Council. 20 Experience in other
states indicates that the practice of suspending a commitment order leads to
abuses. Specifically, many judges will suspend an order on the condition that
the child behave in such a fashion as to avoid any negative report by the
police or by the probation department. Subsequently, if a negative report is
received the judge revokes the suspension and the child is committed without
any further hearing. In essence, then, the child is committed because of the
conduct alleged in the subsequent report---conduct about which no hearing
is ever held. Obviously, such a practice violates the due process of law. 210
Hopefully, Texas judges will not engage in this abusive use of their power to
suspend commitment orders.
Provisions for sealing and expunging files and records in juvenile matters
have been further liberalized by an amendment giving a person whose files
and records have been sealed the right -to deny his past juvenile record in
"any proceeding or in any application for employment, information, or
licensing."' 21 ' Hopefully, the legislature's willingness to adopt such a liberal
stance for the benefit of juvenile offenders portends parallel statutory relief
for adult offenders. At present, however, Texas remains among a shrinking
number of states without any statutory provisions for removal of an adult
criminal record.212
On February 18, 1975, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Gerstein v. Pugh.218 The essence of that.opinion is contained in the
205. Ch. 693, § 2, [1975] Tex. Laws 2153.
206. Id. § 3, at2153.
207. Id. § 23, at 2158.
208. Id. § 25, at 2159.
209. Id.
210. In re C.R.N., 501 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
211. Ch. 693, § 13, [1975] Tex. Laws 2156.
212. See generally, Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses
of Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J. LAw REFORM 32 (1972).
213. 420U.S. 103 (1975).
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following quote from the case: "Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a pre-
requisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. '214 Consequently,
it is now clearly the law of the land that a person cannot be jailed unless a
magistrate finds that there is probable cause for doing so. How do the
provisions of the Texas Juvenile Code square with the doctrine announced
in Gerstein? The answer to this question is that the Texas Juvenile Code
violates the Gerstein doctrine. 215 Section 53.01 of the Juvenile Code provides
that probable cause shall be determined by "the intake officer, probation
officer, or other person authorized by the court." Obviously, that provision
violates Gerstein's command that probable cause be determined by a mag-
istrate. According to the Texas Juvenile Code, a detention hearing for all
juveniles confined must be held not later than the "second working day after
[the child] is taken into custody. ' 216  Unfortunately, however, section 54.01
which describes the procedure at the detention hearing does not require the
judge to determine probable cause, and, in fact, many judges around the state
do not determine probable cause at a detention hearing. That precise issue
was litigated at a constitutional level in a Florida federal district court case
styled Moss v. Weaver.217 There the state argued that the only proper issue
at a detention hearing was the welfare of the child-not probable cause-
and that even an innocent child might be detained if detention were necessary
for his welfare. The court responded that "[t]his concern for the welfare of
the juvenile is laudable, but detention absent a probable cause showing is not
constitutional where the juvenile was taken into custody by an 'arm of the
government for an alleged violation of law." 218
All codes contain provisions allowing prosecution of juveniles as adults
under certain circumstances. The Texas provisions are typical, allowing
juveniles between fifteen and seventeen years of age, who are accused of a
felony, to be "transferred," after a hearing, from juvenile court to criminal
district court for prosecution as an adult.210  According to the Code, six
different factors must be considered by a judge making a transfer decision:
(1) whether the offense was against property or person, (2) whether the
offense was aggressive and premeditated, (3) whether there is evidence to
justify an indictment, (4) the sophistication and maturity of the child, (5) the
child's record, and (6) the adequacy of juvenile services and facilities to
rehabilitate the child and to protect the public. 220  Upon transfer the court
must state "in the order its reasons for waiver." 221
214. Id. at 114.
215. One Texas case has raised the constitutionality of holding a child in detention
without a probable cause hearing, but the issue was declared moot on appeal because
by the time the appeal was heard the child had been certified as an adult, Stephenson
v. State, 515 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ dism'd).
216. Ch. 693, § 14, [1975] Tex. Laws 2156.
217. 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
218. Id. at 133.
219. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (1974).
220. Id. § 54.02(f).
221. Id. § 54.02(h). This theme of clearly articulating the reasons for a court or-
der is repeated throughout the Code, e.g., id. § 54.05(i) Hearing to Modify Disposition:
"The court shall specifically state in the order its reasons for modifying the disposition
and shall furnish a copy of the order to the child."
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In the recent case of In re J.R.C. a juvenile court entered a transfer order
which may be viewed as typical: "[T]he Court after diagnostic study, social
evaluation and full investigation, is of the opinion that it is contrary to the
best interest of said child and to the public to retain jurisdiction. ' 22 2 On ap-
peal the transfer was reversed because: (1) the court did not fulfill its
mandatory duty to consider and file findings concerning all six factors listed
in section 54.02(0; and (2) the court failed to set forth the reasons (i.e.,
motive) for the transfer as required by section 54.02(h). The J.R.C. opinion
should have a very salutory effect on the 'administration of juvenile justice.
It will facilitate the process of appellate review by forcing trial judges to
reveal their thought processes completely in written orders. Furthermore,
J.R.C. forces a judge to consider all six of the criteria for transfer, thus
militating against any tendency to transfer a child simply because of hostile
attitudes toward him among juvenile court personnel.
Precisely because J.R.C. forces the judge to make a thorough and thought-
ful investigation of all the facts at a transfer hearing, another difficult problem
arises. Suppose a judge hears all of the testimony (including testimony on the
issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify an indictment) and then
decides not to transfer the child. Is that judge legally capable of giving
unbiased consideration to the same evidence when the case comes before him
on the merits? 228  Recently, the United States Supreme Court raised that very
issue, but unfortunately did not decide it. 224
Another issue in connection with transfer hearings arises out of the fact
that filing an appeal of a transfer order does not suspend the order. 225 What
result, then, if the person appealing is prosecuted as an adult while the appeal
of the transfer order is pending? That problem has been discussed by the
Texarkana court of civil appeals in In re J.R.C.226  Due to the significance
of the decision, and because the opinion is unpublished, an edited version
is set forth below:
PER CURIAM
This is an original application for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the
'District Court of Harrison County, Texas, from proceeding to try relator
on a criminal charge of murder.
Relator is a sixteen year old male. He allegedly committed an act
of murder when he was fifteen years of age. The District Attorney of
Harrison County, Texas, petitioned the Juvenile Court of that county
222. 522 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. The question of how much evidence of the alleged criminal transaction shouldbe introduced at a transfer hearing was discussed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 536 n.16, 537 n.17, 538 n.18 (1975), holding
that the criteria and evidence required for transfer were not matters of constitutional
dimension, and should be left to the states.
224. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 536-37 (1975) (emphasis added), states that:
To the extent that evidence concerning the alleged offense is consid-
ered relevant, it may be that, in these cases where transfer is considered
and rejected, some added burden will be imposed on the juvenile courts
by reason of duplicative vroceedings. Finally, the nature of the evidence
considered at a transfer hearing may in some States require that, if trans-
fer is rejected, a different judge preside at the adiudicatory hearing.
225. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 56.01 (c)(1), (g) (1974).
226. No. 8257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana, Sept. 24, 1974).
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to waive its jurisdiction over relator as a juvenile, . . . the Juvenile
Court entered its certification order waiving jurisdiction and transferring
the relator to the District Court.
We are required to decide if the District Court should be prohibited
from proceeding to a trial of relator until the appeal of the certification
order is determined on the merits.
Although Sec. 56.01g provides that the appeal does not suspend the
order of the Juvenile Court, it is clear that if our appellate jurisdiction
is to have any effect, all criminal proceedings which might be conducted
during the pendency of the appeal will be without force or effect should
the appeal result in a determination that the certification order was in-
valid.
A Writ of Prohibition will properly issue not only to prohibit a court
from the exercise of unauthorized jurisdiction, but also on equitable
principles and to prevent interference with the efficient enforcement of
an appellate court judgment. 73 C.J.S. Prohibition, Sec. 8; City of
Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1963); Bray v. Schultz, 376
S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no writ); City of Palestine
v. City of Houston, 262 S.W. 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1924,
no writ); Cattlemen's Trust Co. of Fort Worth v. Willis, 179 S.W. 1115
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1915, no writ). The writ will also issue
to prevent a conflict of jurisdiction between two courts having concur-
rent jurisdiction, or to prevent dual trials. 73 C.J.S. Prohibition Sec.
lc; Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Dist. Court, 222 P.2d 514 (Sup.
Court Oklahoma 1950); Gorman v. Superior Court, 72 P.2d 774 (Dist.
Court of App. 4th Dist. California 1937). However, it is not necessary
for us to determine at this point whether or not the writ should issue
under the circumstances existing here, because relator has produced no
evidence that the action he fears is imminently threatened or is actually
about to take place.
In the event that a trial of relator becomes imminently threatened
prior to our decision, we can at that time consider a renewed application
for prohibition.
Apparently, therefore, if the prosecution as an adult is about to commence
while the transfer order is being appealed, counsel for the child would be
wise to seek a writ of prohibition from the appellate court.
Since juveniles often commit offenses in groups, use of accomplice testimo-
ny is important in juvenile proceedings. Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure prohibits a conviction on the sole, uncorroborated,
testimony of an accomplice, but article 38.14 is limited in application to
adult criminal proceedings. The matter is not addressed in the Juvenile
Code, but the recent case of In re S.J.C.227 holds that a juvenile may be
adjudicated a deliniquent on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
even though the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits conviction in adult
court on such evidence.
227. 521 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1975, writ granted). A contrary re-
sult was reached by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Smith v. State, 525
P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974), although the court admitted that there was no con-
stitutional requirement for its decision.
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Evidentiary questions have also arisen at the disposition stage of juvenile
proceedings. First, Tyler v. State holds that a juvenile probation officer's
report containing hearsay may be considered by the court at the disposition
stage of juvenile proceedings. 228 Equally important is an earlier case from
the court of criminal appeals styled Walker v. State.229 Walker raises for
the first time the question of whether a judge at the sentencing stage of an
adult's criminal trial may consider that adult's prior juvenile record. Walker
holds that the prior juvenile record can be considered.
For some reason the Code's explicit provisions requiring service of a
summons on all parties in interest prior to hearings 230 are continuing to be
ignored, thus resulting in unfortunate reversals of cases. 231 Hopefully, all
court personnel are beginning to take the Code provisions regarding sum-
mons literally. For example, section 54.02 provides that prior to a transfer
hearing a summons must be served stating "that the hearing is for the
purpose of considering discretionary transfer to criminal court. '232 A case
was reversed because the summons omitted the phrase: "to criminal
court."23 3 Another case was reversed because the summons did not have
attached all of the pleadings filed by the state at the time the summons was
issued. 234 Furthermore, the cases make it clear that a child's lawyer cannot
waive defects in the child's right to have a proper summons properly served,




Although they do not fit any pattern or fall conveniently under any single
rubric, several recent court opinions are worthy of individual discussion.
Articles 1.03(b) and 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code, read together, might
lead one to the conclusion that strict liability crime (i.e., crime without a
mens rea element) no longer exists in Texas unless the statute defining the
crime plainly dispenses with any mental element. Although articles 1.03(b)
and 6.02 are not models of clarity, they do create doubt about the continuing
validity of such strict liability offenses as traffic violations and driving while
intoxicated. Accordingly, the defendant in Ex parte Jerry Lee Ross 236
contended that his conviction for driving while intoxicated was invalid
because the state failed to allege or prove mens rea. Denying the validity of
the defendant's argument, the court of criminal appeals held that driving
228. 512 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ).
229. 493 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
230. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.06, 53.07 (1974).
231. E.g., In re M.W., 523 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1975, no writ),
where summons for the child was served on the child's attorney, thus necessitating a re-
versal of a transfer order. However, because the child was 18 by the time the appeal
was heard, the case had to be dismissed by the court of civil appeals rather than re-
manded to the juvenile court.
232. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(b) (1974).
233. R.K.M. v. State, 520 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
234. In re K.W.S., 521 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
235. Compare In re K.W.S., 521 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no
writ), with In re C.E.H., 516 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
236. 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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while intoxicated is a well-recognized strict liability offense, and if the
legislature had intended to change the strict liability nature of driving while
intoxicated it would have done so more directly than merely enacting the
general provisions in articles 1.03(b) and 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code. In
the same case, the court of criminal appeals considered the question of
whether allowing non-attorney judges to maintain jurisdiction over criminal
cases constitutes a denial of due process, a question already decided by the
California Supreme Court. 23 7 In contrast to the California decision, the
court found that trial of a criminal case before a non-attorney judge was not
a violation of due process.
Another case raising interesting issues involving the construction of the
new Penal Code is Watts v. State,238 which dealt with the distinction
between robbery and attempted robbery. Watts confronted his victim and
demanded money at gunpoint, but fled before any money was taken.
Declaring that the actual commission of -theft is not prerequisite to commis-
sion of robbery, the court of criminal appeals held that Watts was properly
convicted of the crime of robbery and that the trial court did not commit
error by refusing to charge on the law of attempted robbery.
Branson v. State23 9 is another case which considers issues arising out of
the construction of the new Penal Code. In Branson the defendant, who
was charged with jail escape, defended on the ground that his escape was
justified because of sordid jail conditions. 240 Although the court recognized
that this was a case of first impression and admitted that necessity was
available as a defense to the crime of escape at common law, the court
nevertheless held that intolerable living conditions in prison did not justify
escape. 241  Curiously, neither the court nor the attorney for the defense
specifically discussed article 9.22 of the Texas Penal Code-a new section
which expressly codifies the common law defense of necessity.
The fact that careful tactics and a thorough understanding of the applica-
ble law are necessary when objections are made to an opponent's jury
argument is demonstrated by two recent cases. In the first case, Rodriquez
v. State,242 defense counsel objected to a prejudicial jury argument made by
the state, and his objection was overruled. On appeal, the court of criminal
appeals held that when an objection to a prejudicial jury argument is
overruled, the defense attorney does not have to move for a mistrial in order
to preserve that point for appeal. Rodriquez should be contrasted with the
court of criminal appeals' holding in Kennedy v. State.243 Kennedy's
lawyer objected to a prejudicial jury argument made by the state and his
objection was sustained. However, because he neglected to go further, and
move for a mistrial, his appeal was denied since he received all of the relief
237. Gordon v. People, 525 P.2d 72 (Cal. 1974).
238. 516 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
239. 525 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
240. For a full discussion see G. Dix & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 1035-44 (1973).
241. Cf. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974).
242. 520 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
243. 520 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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he requested from the trial court, and there was no adverse ruling to
complain of on appeal.
Several holdings by federal courts may have some impact on the criminal
jurisprudence of Texas-particularly those dealing with the right to counsel
which arises out of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 244  Once, one could predict with reasonable certainty that whenever a
person was charged with an offense carrying a jail or penitentiary sentence
as potential punishment, that person was entitled to a lawyer at any ad-
versary stage of the proceedings where lawyers necessarily function as
advocates.2 45  Kirby v. Illinois changed all of that by holding that the sixth
amendment right to counsel was triggered, not by the need for an advocate,
but by the commencement of "adversary judicial proceedings. '246  For
example in Kirby, the "adversary judicial proceeding" was the return of the
indictment, and the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled
to counsel at a line-up prior to the return of the indictment. 247
Now, the Supreme Court has returned to the approach that counsel is
required whenever there is a significant job for counsel to do-regardless of
the state of the "judicial proceedings." This most recent trend is reflected in
Gerstein v. Pugh248 where the Supreme Court held that a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause is a prerequisite to placing a person in jail after
arrest. At the same time, however, the Court held that counsel is not
required at the judicial determination of probable cause, because it is not a
"critical stage in the prosecution. 2 49  The defendant in Gerstein was
charged with a misdemeanor and an information had been filed. Surely,
"adversary judicial proceedings" have begun when a person stands charged
with a misdemeanor by information just as "adversary judicial proceedings"
have begun in a felony case by returning the indictment as held in Kirby.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overlooked its earlier reasoning in Kirby
and based its decision in Gerstein on an analysis of what services a lawyer
could perform at the time of the probable cause hearing.
One might speculate about what kind of unfair advantage the state could
gain at a hearing to determine probable cause where the defendant is under
arrest and without counsel. For example, would the state be allowed to
introduce evidence acquired during the arrest or as a result of the arrest and
244. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
245. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), states that: "(a]bsent a know-
ing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classi-
fied as petty, misdemeanor, or felony unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."
As to the "functional approach" to the question of when a lawyer is constitutionally nec-
essary, see Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration
of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J. 488 (1969); cf. Steele, Right
to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REv. 193
(1971).
246. "[A] person's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only
at or after the time that the adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him. . . ." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
247. See generally Steele, Kirby v. Illinois: Counsel at Lineups, 9 CuM. L. BULL.
49 (1973).
248. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
249. Id. at 122. It is interesting to note that Kirby v. Illinois was not cited by the
Court in its Gerstein v. Pugh opinion.
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thus "bootstrap" itself into convincing the magistrate that there was probable
cause for the arrest in the first place?
Another nebulous problem in the area of the constitutional right to counsel
is the question of the adequacy of counsel's performance. In Kallie v.
Estelle250 an attorney who had been retained learned that his fee for appeal
would not be paid by the now indigent defendant. Consequently, the
attorney abandoned the appeal without notice to the defendant or to the
court. Similar fact situations appear rather frequently in appellate court
opinions, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had "no trouble characteriz-
ing these actions of Kallie's retained counsel as well below the minimum
standards imposed upon a criminal lawyer in protecting his client's inter-
ests. 12 51 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit court characterized such conduct as
ineffective assistance as a matter of law. 25" However, because Kallie's
offending counsel was retained, the court concluded that there was insuffi-
cient state action to declare that Kallie was denied fundamental fairness by
the state. Given the unfortunate frequency with which situations like the
one in Kallie occur, it is interesting to speculate what might happen if
convicts begin to file malpractice actions with the same vigor and frequency
as they have filed writs of habeas corpus over the past years.
XV. CONCLUSION
Although there were few dramatic developments during this annual
survey period, the enactments of the Sixty-Fourth Legislature and judicial
developments in the law related to witnesses in criminal cases and juvenile
delinquency are certainly noteworthy. Also, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh258 will probably have a continuing
impact on the ability of the state to detain its citizens without a probable
cause hearing. It is hoped that this Survey will provide a helpful update of
Texas criminal law and procedure to both the student and practitioner.
250. 515 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1975).
251. Id. at 590.
252. Id. at n.4
253. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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